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Introduction 
 
There is a mounting recognition of the utility of an ethic of care approach in researching family 
policy and practice (See for example Barnes, 2012; Morris and Featherstone, 2010; Smart and Neale, 
1999; Williams, 2004a and 2004b). To some extent this is a recognition of the centrality of caring 
practices to dominant understandings of family life, and therefore analysis of concepts of care offers 
an opportunity to evaluate the adequacy and distribution of care practices. A number of authors 
have also commented on the significance of moral judgements of care practices within families as 
constituting the ways in which individual identities are constructed, for example in the normative 
evaluations of what it means to be a ‘good mother’ (Finch and Mason, 1993; Hughes, 2002) or 
indeed a ‘troubled family’. Hughes argues that, “Through the negotiations of giving and receiving 
care, reputations as a ‘good’ person are at stake. In these enactments of responsibility, therefore, 
people are constructed as moral beings” (Hughes, 2002: 119). In this sense, an evaluation of the 
social, political and moral dimensions of care provides a mechanism to challenge ‘othering’ 
discourses constructed around disadvantaged families (Lister, 2004; Parr and Nixon, 2008) where 
care practices may reflect the complex contexts in which they are organised, such as “when families 
are living in a situation of material disadvantage and in physical environments that make everyday 
survival a struggle” (Barnes, 2012:39).  
In addition to this focus on care practices within families, reflecting upon care ethics also generates 
useful frameworks for evaluating the practices of those whose role is to support disadvantaged 
families. Conceptualising such work as ‘care’ offers a discursive challenge to the policy and rhetoric 
which has tended to surround such ‘troubled’ or ‘anti-social’ families, often characterised by the 
language of enforcement, control and responsibilisation (Levitas, 2012; Bond-Taylor, 2014a). 
Engaging with the concept of care has the potential to provide a unifying focus both for the 
identification of ‘care’ activities within families and family support services, and as an ethical, moral 
and political framework by which family policy and service provision can be evaluated. 
This paper therefore engages with ongoing debates about care ethics in order to evaluate current 
policy and practice emerging out of the Troubled Families Unit. Firstly, it reflects upon the 
experiences of families and their key workers, and the value that they place on care ethics within 
family support services. Secondly, it questions the extent to which the family intervention model 
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advocated within the Troubled Families Programme encompasses an ethic of care and how this 
might be impacted by the managerialist tendencies of the Troubled Families Programme.  
 
What is meant by an Ethic of Care? 
 
The genealogy of the ethic of care can be traced to the work of Carol Gilligan in her 1982 text In a 
Different Voice, in which she challenged the dominant notions of morality pervading psychology and 
moral philosophy at that time, most notably from the work of her PhD supervisor Lawrence 
Kohlberg. Kohlberg’s model of the stages of moral development emphasised Kantian principles of 
‘justice’ as the key to superior moral decision making, through the application to any given situation 
of abstract and generalisable rules about ‘right’ or ‘wrong’. Gilligan’s research revealed a different 
moral voice which she argued was more common amongst female research participants, and which 
emphasised principles of ‘care’ rather than ‘justice’ and prioritised situational decision making over 
abstracted rules. She therefore highlighted the gendered nature of moral philosophy, with masculine 
moral concepts of rights, rules and objectivity seen as superior to feminine notions of morality 
enacted through care, relationships and harm prevention. 
Gilligan’s claim that men and women have fundamentally different ways of reasoning may be 
criticised for its biological essentialism, however rejecting such reductionism does not require a 
concomitant rejection of all arguments around gendered depictions of morality. The social 
construction of gender within the context of patriarchal capitalism has segregated the male (public) 
domains and the female (private) domains, and the ethical principles which are seen to govern these 
domains therefore become associated with the respective gender (Friedman, 1987). Furthermore, if 
gender is understood in terms of performance (Butler, 1990), adherence to the ascribed moral codes 
of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ become a central mechanism by which gender identities are 
constructed and maintained.  
Gilligan’s research argued that women are more likely than men to engage in situated and relational 
decision making styles, and we can reflect upon the ways in which the social construction of gender 
and the social organisation of gender roles (rather than a biological essentialism) might produce this 
outcome. Given that caring duties continue to be differentially distributed between the genders, 
there may also be gendered differences in the values expressed during decision making practices, 
since care givers may need to take into consideration their caring obligations and the impact of any 
decisions upon those for whom they provide care. Research into ‘family’ as a set of practices 
oriented around relationality and care must therefore consider whether gender in itself determines 
the deployment or otherwise of a care ethic, or whether it is the practice of engaging in traditionally 
‘feminine’ caring activities. Fathers or other male relatives who are primarily responsible for the care 
needs of their families may therefore also deploy care ethics. 
Gilligan (1998, cited in Hughes, 2002) has furthermore distinguished between a feminine ethic of 
care and a feminist ethic of care, which offers a useful means of evaluating the way in which the 
individual relates their caring identity to wider social values. A feminine care ethic, she argues, is an 
ethic of special obligations and interpersonal relationships based upon self-sacrifice and which is 
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oppositional to self-development. It accepts the patriarchal social order, including the primacy of 
rationality, autonomy and justice as higher order psychological states. By contrast, a feminist care 
ethic exposes this as evidence of patriarchal relations and thus offers a critique of the inequalities 
inherent within justice-oriented principles. From this perspective, because inter-relatedness is 
central to human life, then autonomy, rather than being the means of solving problems, becomes 
the problem itself – producing a disconnection from emotions and relationships which creates both 
psychological and political problems. A feminist analysis therefore demands a reconsideration of the 
political contexts and gendered distribution of acts of ‘care’. Evaluating the extent to which there is 
evidence of care ethics within the practices of families and within the operationalization of support 
services is therefore complicated by the need to determine also whether this ethic of care is feminist 
or merely feminine in values.  
From these early observations, Gilligan’s analysis of an ethic of care has been developed into a 
substantive framework which has extended far beyond its origins in feminist psychology (Barnes, 
2012:11) and has application to a wide range of social policy concerns. However, the ethic of care 
perspective appears to have had very limited application in the field of criminology, with the 
exception of its cross over from social work to probation services (Gregory, 2010; 2011) and in the 
global field of international violence and human rights (Held, 2008; 2010). The challenge which an 
ethic of care poses to principles of ‘justice’ appears to present a valuable opportunity for critical 
criminological analysis, especially in the spaces where criminal justice policy and social policy collide, 
where we see the ‘criminalisation of social policy’ (Rodgers, 2008) or indeed the ‘socialisation of 
crime policy’ (Hughes et al, 2007). Barnes (2012) has argued that an ethic of care fits more 
comfortably with the concept of social justice than criminal justice, since it stands in opposition to 
legally oriented ‘justice’ principles. However, some of the binary oppositions evident within Gilligan’s 
work have been deconstructed in subsequent texts in an attempt to develop a more fully theorised 
account of care ethics (Friedman, 1987; Hughes, 2002; Barnes, 2012), and it is through those 
analyses which have integrated justice and care principles that an ethic of care approach might also 
usefully be extended to the state’s responses to criminal wrong-doing and broader aspects of 
‘deviant’ or ‘anti-social’ behaviour. 
 
Key Principles of Care Ethics 
 
Tronto (1993) describes four principles necessary for the integrity of care: attentiveness, 
responsibility, competence and responsiveness. Each of these relates directly to one of four stages 
of caring: caring about, taking care of, care giving, care receiving. ‘Care’ practices which do not 
reflect these four principles of care are seen as ethically problematic and contrary to social justice 
objectives. These can be seen as deriving from a range of neglectful responses to the needs of 
others, including a lack of attentiveness to the circumstances of others which might reveal care 
needs, a failure to act upon the recognition of care needs, the incompetent and insufficient provision 
of care such that care needs might fail to be met in practice, and a lack of concern with the feelings 
of the care receiver which might fruitfully be used to improve care practices. 
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Barnes (2012) has suggested that to this typology we should also add Selma Sevenhuijsen’s principle 
of trust as a fifth principle of care and Enger’s principle of respect as a sixth principle, acknowledging 
that  others are worthy of our responsiveness, and are not lesser beings because they cannot meet 
their own care needs. It is evident that not only would Tronto’s four principles of care generate trust 
and respect between care giver and care receiver, but that trust and respect are also essential for 
those four principles to be adequately enacted. Being attentive to needs, for example is not easy 
where lack of trust means that the care receiver does not feel able to be open about their 
circumstances. Similarly the competent and responsive provision of support to meet care needs 
requires that the care receiver trusts the care giver to do so respectfully and accepts the care 
offered. Building relationships of trust and respect are therefore a central concern of an ethic of care 
perspective, and this highlights the relational character of care (Barnes, 2012). According to Barnes 
(2012: 25): 
“Not only does care reflect the relational ontology of human life, and not only is it provided through 
relationships, it can generate dialogic processes that develop relational capacities among both care 
giver and care receiver. We develop our capacity to care through the practice of care with others.”  
To these 6 principles of care, I would also add three further principles described by Smart and Neale 
(1999) as necessary within an ethic of care approach to children and families: actuality, recognition 
of selfhood, and recognition of loss. 
The principle of actuality advocates that decisions are made in relation to the reality of people’s lives 
rather than highly abstracted or idealised notions of ‘childhood’ or ‘family’ and that it they should 
consider the practical contexts in which ‘care’ within families operates. This principle provides a 
clear contrast with the homogenising tendencies of neo-liberal policy and managerialist practice in 
which the complexity and uniqueness of the experiences of individuals and ‘families’ is reduced to a 
classification (as ‘at risk’, ‘troubled’, ‘anti-social’ etc) (Garrett, 2009), and where “…social values and 
moral issues are reduced to technical rationality, cut adrift from political debate involving interests 
and power, while social justice, material conditions and social inequalities are obscured from view” 
(Edwards et al, 2015). 
The principle of recognition of selfhood demands that people are recognised as individuals capable 
of constructing their own identities, and that we consider the ways in which family and caring 
responsibilities can impinge upon the individual’s capacity to maintain a sense of self. This reflects 
feminist care ethics in that it supports a critique of social structures and policies which 
disproportionately impose caring responsibilities on some citizens rather than others (traditionally 
women within the domestic sphere) without consideration of the potentially damaging impact of 
this burden on the individual. 
 The principle of recognition of loss acknowledges that interventions  cannot always resolve disputes 
and return a situation to the way it was prior to that dispute. The basis of legalistic concepts of 
‘justice’ is that law can be used to rebalance society and provide recompense when somebody is 
wronged.  However, in the context of relationships, legal declarations that ‘justice’ has been 
achieved can have little relevance to those involved, who continue to feel aggrieved or hurt, and 
they can therefore serve to drive a wedge further between the parties to the dispute. An ethic of 
care therefore looks to prioritise attempts to sustain dialogue and rebuild relationships, looking to 
the future, rather than to promise instant, magical solutions to the problem. 
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Finally, if these principles are to be applied within a feminist ethic of care which challenges 
inequitable social relationships and pursues social justice goals,  then they must be accompanied 
with a concern with the politicisation of ‘care’ in society. The body of work emerging on an ethic of 
care is increasingly challenging the distinction between the public and private and rejects the notion 
that care is a ‘private’ concern. The application of ethic of care theory to politics and social policy has 
drawn attention to the ways in which care is a political issue and that care ethics cannot reside 
within the private sphere alone, echoing feminist perspectives that emphasise the personal as 
political. Extending the ethic of care analysis from the private to the public therefore renders for 
analysis the actions of government, in the construction of social problems and their solutions, the 
distribution of funding for care, and the collective organisation of care practices. It offers therefore 
an opportunity to move up from practice to policy, and to challenge the discursive formations which 
construct social action in ways which prioritise ‘justice’ reasoning and neglect ‘care’ ethics. We can 
no longer understand relationships of care as personal or private: 
 “Care cannot be separated from other aspects of interpersonal relationships that embody gendered 
expectations, power relationships and the potential for abuse as well as nurturing. People’s capacity 
to do care well within families is affected by the extent to which care is valued and supported 
socially and practically” (Barnes, 2012:38-39) [My emphasis].  
These principles of care must therefore feature within policy formulations not just within grass-roots 
practice since the possibility of change through political action is dependent upon the appropriate 
vocabularies being in place, of being able to ‘speak’ care within policy contexts (MacKay, 2001: 216). 
 
Family Experiences of ‘Care’ in Family Interventions 
 
The voices of the families and project key workers included here have been drawn from a piece of 
research conducted on behalf of Lincolnshire County Council to evaluate their Families Working 
Together service (Bond-Taylor and Somerville, 2013) which pre-dates the Troubled Families 
Programme launched in December 2011. This service had been initiated in 2010 as one of the 16 
community budget pilots for supporting families with complex needs established by the Department 
for Communities and Local Government to test the extent to which ‘joined-up’ multi-agency funding 
and governance structures could provide improved services to vulnerable people. Like the Troubled 
Families model, the project’s family intervention approach was characterised by the allocation of a 
dedicated key worker to each family to offer a wraparound service, drawing up a plan of support 
including a range of incentives and disincentives for the family, and co-ordinating the services 
involved with the family to promote a more seamless delivery. However, the criteria for family 
inclusion in the service were significantly different, being: families which had at least one child or 
young person; had a minimum of three needs or challenges; had had involvement from at least four 
agencies; and where agencies have been working with the family for a minimum of twelve months.  
Within this research, we interviewed all 14 key workers and their two practice supervisors, 12 
families supported by the service, as well as 30 professionals from a range of partner organisations, 
including both management and operational staff. The interviews which we conducted with both 
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families and key workers within the Community Budget Pilot revealed the importance of 
relationships of care within work with families with complex needs. The ways in which they 
described the relationship between key worker and family suggested that successful family 
interventions operate within a care ethics framework, and that understanding the nature of this is of 
central importance to policy makers.  
Some families already had a strong sense of themselves as a family, and expected the key worker to 
take that on board and work around their version of what family life was like; as one family member 
said in praise of their key worker: “She kind of gets us as a family” (young person). For other families, 
the key worker played an important role in working with them to explore what ‘family’ could mean, 
and the ways in which families can differ in their structures and relationships whilst still being an 
effective family unit which meets the care needs of each individual member.   
“It’ll mean we’ll have to like… it’ll be a bit trickier but I think doing what [our key worker] told us to 
do we’ll become like a proper good family.”   (young person) 
Families were therefore clear that the key worker respected their own version of ‘doing family’, who 
‘family’ might include and how ‘family life’ might look within this family uniquely. Moreover, it was 
of central importance to them that their key worker engaged with them on a personal level and did 
not treat them as just another family to deal with. Many of the families referred to their keyworker 
as a friend and saw them as part of the family. 
 “She takes the interest, not as a social worker but as a friend of the family.” (parent) 
 “To get into a family you’ve got to befriend a family, and the family’s got to treat them as a friend” 
(parent) 
This was echoed in the key worker interviews, with one describing her role as being “a critical friend” 
(key worker) and another saying that “you almost live with the family” (key worker). The key worker 
was perceived by families as having a personal interest in the case, and caring about the outcomes 
for the family for more than just professional reasons:    
“She’s not acting as a case worker or whatever it is you like to call her, she’s acting as a friend.  She 
cared.”  (parent) 
“She puts her heart and her mind into it, and that is the thing that I’ve never had.” (parent) 
This is in sharp contrast to families’ previous experiences of social work which was perceived as 
impersonal, arbitrary and unjust: 
“With the social workers, because it says it, then that’s true, they don’t actually get to know the 
family.”  (parent) 
“We were a case and not a family” (young person) 
Families identified the ways in which such depersonalised ways of intervening in family life were 
counter-productive because they threatened to further damage the fragile relationships within the 
family in that they act to divide and rule rather than to strengthen family capacity: 
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“[Social workers] were making suggestions to me about my behaviour bringing them up, how to 
bring them up, and I was trying to do it, and the result was the little bit of love that we had between 
the family, went out the window.  There was a great big wall built up.  ‘Oh Dad, you’re always 
listening to what the social services says.  We don’t agree with that’.”   (parent) 
Indeed, a number of key workers commented on the need to distance themselves from social care 
from the outset in order to overcome family concerns about letting in “another do-gooder” (parent).  
As one key worker described: 
“One of my first opening lines is that I’m not a social worker and they respond much better realising 
that you’re there to support.” (key worker) 
Establishing trust and honesty were therefore central to the work of the key worker:  
“It’s a case of the key worker getting to know the family, because the family have entrusted us, and 
they’ve allowed us into their lives, so it’s about us as individuals getting to know what it is they 
would like to see changed” (key worker) 
 “I generally find with families, ultimately, they want things to change, and it’s building up that trust 
and relationship with them, so that you can then say to them ‘The only way things are going to 
change is by you doing things differently’” (key worker) 
“Some families, you’re probably the only person that goes in that’s non-judgemental, honest, and 
straight with the family about things, and encouraging them all the time, praising them when things 
have worked” (key worker) 
Therefore, whilst the intervention of some statutory services is experienced by families as distant, 
frightening, confusing and unpredictable, families trusted their key worker to support them in 
engaging with these services, acting as a buffer or intermediary to advocate for the interests of the 
family as a whole, alongside the best interests of the child. 
 “Yeah, you know, like, when social services get involved you’re very nervous, you know, are they 
going to take the children away? All sorts of things run into your head, don’t they? But I find with my 
key worker I don’t have to worry about that because she’s there to support me and I know that my 
children are not going to get taken off me and she’s there to support me, and that I’m not there on 
my own, I don’t have to battle everything on my own.”  (parent) 
Knowing that you aren’t alone is clearly important and a problem shared may well be a problem 
halved. For many of the families, the most important feature of the support was just having 
someone to talk to about their problems, and importantly knowing that someone cared enough to 
listen to what they had to say, and respected their opinion on the matter. The impact of this on self-
esteem was also notable and family members developed further strength and resilience because of 
this: 
“I was happy every day because I loved helping myself. I found it really good that I was doing it, 
because it’s something that I never done before.”  (young person) 
“Being able to hold my head up and not down.  I can look at people now and not like look away... 
now I can actually look up and smile.” (parent) 
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It is clear therefore, that within this service, family interventions reflect relational modes of working 
with families underpinned by care ethics. Key workers are attentive to the needs of the family, and 
take responsibility for either the direct provision of support or the co-ordination of other providers. 
They advocate for the needs of the families and thus also ensure the competent provision of support 
which meets their needs. They also demonstrate responsiveness to the ways in which families 
experience the support from their key worker and others and are careful to ensure that their self-
esteem are not damaged by the interventions. Trust and respect are central to the relationships 
established between key worker and family and are also promoted between family members, whilst 
acknowledging that some relationships may not be capable of being rebuilt and are doing more 
harm than good (for example where there is a violent partner living in the home). Families 
appreciate key workers treating them as an individual family rather than as just one case in the case 
load, and the principle of actuality is clearly evident in the ways in which key workers provide holistic 
and family specific support within the context of the specific family practices of the household. 
However, alongside this, they work with individuals within the family to ensure that they also have 
the space to develop their self-identity. Families value support services delivered within a framework 
of situated care ethics and families with complex and multiple needs may particularly benefit from 
these relational strategies of support. Family intervention services certainly have the potential to 
incorporate care ethics into their modes of working with families in a way which is effective and 
which is appreciated by families.  
 
Tracing an Ethic of Care in Troubled Families Policy Documents 
 
It has been argued that principles of care are characteristic of the relationships and care practices 
which take place at the micro-level, but are less evident in the normative principles espoused in 
policy documents at the macro-level (Sevenhiujsen, 2003).  Even where, on face value, care ethics 
appear within policy documents, Gilligan (1995) argues that it is also important to distinguish 
between the articulation of ‘care’ within a justice framework and care as a framework in itself, 
providing an alternative to the justice framework. Within a justice framework, care merely becomes 
“the mercy that tempers justice” (Gilligan, 1995:36) but leaves the basic justice framework intact. It 
allows for exceptions to the rule, rather than refining the rules themselves. Macro-level articulations 
of ‘care’ values within policy documents must therefore be critically evaluated for evidence of a 
wider consideration of care ethics, and for evidence of contradictory moral frameworks which will 
dilute care ethics or provide obstacles to their practical application. 
Selma Sevenhuijsen, during research analysing a Dutch health care policy report, developed Trace, a 
methodological framework for policy analysis which “takes the feminist ethic of care as its main 
point of reference” and aims to “evaluate the normative frameworks of policy documents that deal 
in one way or another with care” (2004:13). There are a number of subsequent examples of the 
Trace method being successfully used within research projects focusing on an analysis of family and 
parenting policy. Fiona Williams (2004a) book Rethinking Families provides an account of the 
application of a Trace approach within the Care Values and the Future of Welfare (CAVA) research 
project, and she has also used Trace to critically evaluate the Every Child Matters Green Paper 
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(2004b). Murray and Barnes (2012) have utilised the Trace method to undertake an analysis of 
‘Whole Family’ discourses emerging from the Think Family policy stream, enabling them to identify 
dichotomous representations of ‘family’ within policy documents and to reflect upon the ways in 
which these are reinterpreted by practitioners working with families. 
According to Sevenhuijsen, an ethic of care adds two dimensions to analyses of policy documents. 
Firstly, it acts as a lens, “a set of spectacles through which the normative frameworks in policy 
documents can be traced” (2004:16), providing the analyst with “a set of sensitizing questions and 
concepts that should assist in digging out the relevant elements in policy documents” (2004:16). 
Secondly, as a framework of moral values, it serves as a standard by which policy and practice can be 
assessed, and by which discussion of ‘care’ in everyday life can be illuminated. Trace therefore 
provides a mechanism by which these two objectives can be achieved, allowing an ethic of care to 
be developed as a methodological and epistemological strategy “in a situated way” (2004: 16) which 
is conscious of the power and value systems inherent in technologies of knowledge production.  
Sevenhuijsen argues that policy documents act as “vehicles of normative paradigms” (2004:14-15) 
and thus Trace offers a method by which these can be identified, unpicked and subject to challenge. 
Through this, care is positioned as a political concept and as a “social and moral practice in notions 
of citizenship” (Sevenhuijsen, 2004:14).  Normative paradigms configure ‘knowledge’ in ways which 
construct social problems as particular kinds of issues and concerns, in order to regulate social life. 
They thus act as ‘modes of governance’,  and determine the power relationships between political 
authorities and their subjects, reflecting Foucauldian analyses of purposive discursive formations 
which constitute the subject  (Foucault, 1972; see also Henry and Milovanovic, 2003).  
“From this perspective normative paradigms are broader then value statements: they also contain 
modes of defining problems and recurrent ways of speaking and judging. By preferring certain 
narrative conventions and modes of communication, policy documents encapsulate power. They 
confer power upon certain speaking positions and vocabularies, and are therefore instrumental in 
producing hegemonic discourses, in including and excluding certain modes of speaking.” 
(Sevenhuijsen, 2004:15) 
Sevenhuijsen’s Trace method therefore provides a useful mechanism for the analysis of documents 
generated within the Troubled Families Programme. Most notably, DCLG has provided guidance for 
local authorities within the document, Working with Troubled Families which describes its objectives 
thus: 
“…this report is an aid for that change. It is a tool to help local authorities and their partners, who 
have asked for guidance on how best to work with troubled families, and for the evidence about 
family intervention to be brought together in one place” (DCLG, 2012: 6) 
Commentators have already pointed out that the depiction of this report as ‘evidence-led policy 
making’ is problematic (Levitas, 2012; Portes, 2012; Talbot, 2013; Hayden and Jenkins, 2014), 
particularly given the fact that it does not offer a full review of the literature and draws some of this 
evidence from the widely criticised report by Louise Casey, Listening to Troubled Families. These two 
reports are presented as operating as a pair, with reference to each report contained (explicitly or 
implicitly) within the other. Within the conclusion of Listening to Troubled Families, it is describes 
how, “The next part of the challenge will be to understand more about how the success with families 
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is achieved, and then to seek to widen this approach to a far larger group of families across the 
country; to reshape, redesign and refocus services” (DCLG, 2012: 64). Then, in Casey’s foreword to 
Working with Troubled Families she indicates the report’s origins in the interviews conducted for 
Listening to Troubled Families: “I wanted to set out for the first time in one place what these families 
had told me about what it was about family intervention that had been different, in the context of 
the evidence about the family intervention approach” (DCLG, 2012: 4). 
The family intervention approach advocated within Working with Troubled Families is grounded in 
family focused working and can be seen to reflect an ethic of care in a number of ways, illustrated by 
the statement: 
“This work requires a single dedicated worker to walk in the shoes of these families every day. To 
look at the family from the inside out, to understand its dynamics as a whole, and to offer practical 
help and support” (DCLG, 2012: 4) 
The notion of shifting perspective to assess families “from the inside out rather than the outside in” 
(DCLG, 2012: 26) is an acknowledgement of the importance of understanding the unique contexts of 
family life and to develop a deeper understanding of the ways in which individuals within families 
are interconnected rather than autonomous. It is argued within the report that families often see 
traditional services as failing to understand them because they don’t see the whole picture, and 
instead attempt to provide numerous individualised responses to problems which are isolated from 
each other. This reflects concerns by care ethicists that ‘justice’ oriented approaches fail to take into 
account the constraints on decision making which individuals face when they consider their caring 
and interpersonal obligations. For example, actions taken within a school to punish a young person 
for their non-attendance will have little impact if they are frequently absent in order to support a 
parent with physical or mental health needs. Moreover, understanding the specific dynamics of 
households and the family practices in which they engage enables the care ethics principle of 
actuality to be actioned, with family workers being attentive to the direct needs of each individual 
family rather than ‘troubled families’ as a whole. This can generate more appropriate ‘bespoke’ 
responses, particularly where “workers can identify strengths that the family may have and involve 
the family in coming up with solutions” (DCLG, 2012: 25). 
Understanding families and their complex biographies is described as demanding considerable 
empathy from the dedicated family intervention workers who are seen to be “standing alongside the 
families, their difficulties and the process being put in place” (DCLG, 2012: 18). This empathy is 
essential in trying to understand how things feel for the family (DCLG, 2012: 25) and thus provides an 
anti-dote to neo-liberal perspectives which focus on measurable outcomes rather than more 
subjective evaluations. However, empathy is also seen within this report as a strategy for making 
families more receptive to behaviour modification interventions since “The skill needed on the part 
of the key worker is the ability to deliver tough messages with empathy, and based in a real 
understanding of the families’ situation” (DCLG, 2012: 24). What is different about family 
interventions in comparison to family experiences of other services is that the family worker does 
not merely provide the tough message about what needs to change, but that they are also active in 
supporting the family to make these changes and to understand how to do so.  
The provision of practical help and support is therefore also an important feature of family 
intervention work from a care ethics perspective. The care ethics principles of responsibility and 
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competence demand that key workers provide adequate support for families and do not merely 
issue ultimatums about what needs to change. They must engage with families to provide practical 
solutions to help families overcome the specific obstacles to change which they face. The provision 
of practical help, of literally donning a pair of rubber gloves and working with families on cleaning 
and clearing jobs within the home is also seen as an important way of building trust, a key principle 
of care ethics. Honest and productive relationships of trust are seen within the report as integral to 
the family intervention approach and practical support can initiate this since they “signal to families 
that the worker intends to keep their promises and is there to help” (DCLG, 2012: 21) thus setting 
out how this service differs from others experienced by families in the past. This again is seen in the 
report as enabling more coercive messages to be given to families about their situation “including 
absolute clarity about what needs to change, how it can change and the consequences of not doing 
so” (DCLG, 2012: 24). 
The report also recognises to a lesser extent the impact on the emotional well-being of the family 
members of the provision of family support grounded in empathy and trust. This is illustrated within 
the report through a quote from one of the Listening to Troubled Families interviews: 
 “L [the worker] were the first person to ask me that. And I think, maybe because I talked through all 
my personal stuff, that I felt I could trust her…She asked me things, though, that no-one else ever 
asked me…She wanted to know…and it was just nice to know that she actually gave a stuff about 
helping me rather than just getting what she needed done, done.” (DCLG, 2012:17) 
This statement echoes an ethic of care in that the interviewee clearly values the fact that the key 
worker actually cared about her as an individual, that she ‘gave a stuff’. Not only does this illustrate 
the importance of attentiveness to need, and principle of actuality with the interviewee treated as 
an individual, but it also depicts the importance of the recognition of selfhood, of being able to share 
biographical experiences and present ones ‘self’ as worthy of support. This is echoed elsewhere in 
the report: 
“Families can feel that the relationship with a case worker is very different to other agencies. They 
are clear that they want to feel that they are treated as a human being, that they are listened to, and 
that their individual circumstances are being taken into account.” (DCLG, 2012:20) 
Building these relationships equally enable families to see their support workers as human beings, as  
“just normal people” (DCLG, 2012: 19) rather than as representatives of an agency (eg social work, 
the council etc). The report describes how families tend to talk about their key worker by name and 
see that it is they as an individual, rather than the service in which they are located, that has helped 
them improve their lives (DCLG, 2012:19). This relationship enables the key worker to support 
families who often have lengthy histories of unsuccessful service referrals, characterised by poor 
communication and depersonalised interventions. Through advocacy and service co-ordination they 
can begin “re-opening communication with these agencies” (DCLG, 2012:17). 
However, in order to do so, the importance of trust and relationship building is extended to the 
multi-agency partnerships in which key workers operate, and the report acknowledges that they  
need to be “invested with the trust and the support to oversee what the family really needs in order 
to change” (DCLG, 2012:28). This further illustrates a point frequently made by care ethicists, that 
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individuals are rarely either care providers or care receivers, and that those providing care also need 
care to support their own needs in that process.  
 
Challenges to Care Ethics within Troubled Families Policy Documents 
 
Alongside these depictions of the family intervention model as characterised by care ethics, there 
exists extensive legalistic language which perhaps reflects an ethic of justice rather than an ethic of 
care.  In particular, the notion of contractual arrangements for support is a significant feature of the 
Working with Troubled Families model, based in the strategy developed within the original Dundee 
Families Project model which saw “families signing up to a contract that offered a mix of support and 
challenge to them with a new threat of sanction if families refused help” (DCLG, 2012:11) and which 
elsewhere in the report is described as “a written contract that the family and agencies sign” (DCLG, 
2012:23). This language of ‘contractual governance’ (Crawford, 2003) is founded in the liberal notion 
of two free and equal parties making a fair exchange of terms for mutual benefit. Yet in the context 
of family interventions, this raises questions about the relative power of the ‘parties’ to the contract 
to determine the conditions and the penalties for non-adherence, echoing Crawford’s critique that 
such contractual governance is ‘inauthentic’ and facilitates ‘regulated self-regulation’ (Crawford, 
2003: 488). Whilst some examples are given of the benefits for the family members, such as 
redecorating childrens’ bedrooms in return for their attendance at school, elsewhere this is unclear 
and the benefits appear to be simply the avoidance of sanctions, such as eviction for non-
maintenance of property as in the following case study in the report: 
“Lisa challenged the family about the state of the property and put in a contract with the family 
which required them to meet certain conditions – for example keeping it clean.”  (DCLG, 2012:7) 
Indeed the threat of sanctions is depicted as essential for the success of the family intervention 
model since “the threat of sanctions such as loss of tenancy ‘concentrates the mind’ of families and 
is a key mechanism for bringing about change” (DCLG, 2012:28). This understanding of human 
behaviour in terms of the autonomous, rational calculation of risk and reward certainly reflects a 
model of justice ethics which stands in sharp contrast to the relational understandings of families 
depicted elsewhere in the report. 
Moreover, the need for sanctions and ‘tough consequences’ as a strategy to secure engagement 
depicts ‘troubled families’ as devious and evasive, and this is echoed in the repeated use of language  
to describe the family intervention service engagement with families. Here we see that “Families and 
their problems are gripped”(DCLG, 2012:27), that “Cases are not allowed to drift” (DCLG, 2012: 27) 
and that doing too much for families is “allowing them off the hook” (DCLG, 2012: 22). Key workers 
are thus described as  “persistent, tenacious and assertive” (DCLG, 2012: 23), as “relentless” (DCLG, 
2012b: 24), and as “authoritative and challenging” (DCLG, 2012: 27) and that this is necessary to 
prompt a “wake up moment” (DCLG, 2012: 27) for families.  It is therefore illuminating that at times 
within the report, families are described passively as having being “worked with” (DCLG, 2012: 11, 
14) rather than as active and equal participants in generating solutions and moving the family 
forward. There are therefore some clear tensions between the depictions of care-full engagement 
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with the feelings and experiences of families and the practice of engaging families through threat of 
sanctions. 
In addition to these tensions within the Working with Troubled Families report, the depiction of a 
holistic family intervention model based in care ethics within this report stands in even more marked 
contrast to the stereotypical and stigmatising depiction of families in the Listening to Troubled 
Families document (Casey, 2012). Here, families (or at least some family members) are held 
responsible for the problems which they face with seemingly little attempt to take into account 
wider contexts:  
“…it was clear that the reasons for that behaviour had come from the household itself – the poor 
parenting skills, the constant changes in the home, family and partners, and the ongoing verbal and 
physical violence” (Casey, 2012: 59) 
The use of rhetorical devices such as ‘it was clear’ (Casey, 2012: 51, 54, 59), “Unsurprisingly…” 
(Casey, 2012: 50) or “Understandably…” (Casey, 2012: 50) appear throughout the report to 
demonstrate the strength of the position Casey is taking. In this way, Casey’s perspective is 
positioned as absolute whilst families’ perspectives are frequently denied/undermined, for example: 
“Many of the families complained about professionals or agencies involved with them, and in 
particular, social services. However it would not be fair to always lay blame there when looked at 
dispassionately.” (Casey, 2012: 51)  
By contrast, the report consistently apportions blame to families without corroborative evidence, in 
spite of the fact that they have also reported being failed by services. Families are portrayed as non-
cooperative, with claims that they lied to professionals, blagged, refused help, refused to cooperate, 
deflected inquiries etc (Casey, 2012: 51). Yet suggestions by families that professionals may have 
also done these things are deflected.  
Whilst Casey claims that “No judgements are made on individual families” (Casey, 2012: 2) the 
judgment made on ‘troubled families’ as a whole is that they are entirely “dysfunctional” and this 
dysfunction is positioned in opposition to “normal” families: 
“The impression of families’ isolation from more ‘normal’ or positive friends or networks came 
across strongly…They tended to stick with a network of other dysfunctional peers.”  (Casey, 2012: 
50) 
Families struggling to cope with the complex circumstances in which they find themselves are 
therefore further undermined by this unhelpful creation of stigmatising  discourses in which the 
language of ‘troubled families’ is used to present the families as ‘other’ rather than to understand 
families “from the inside out” and develop empathy and care-full systems of support. Thus whilst 
these two reports are presented as a pair which work together, with one informing the other, the 
depictions of ‘family’ and the support which they deserve are quite different. It is much more 
difficult to see care ethics influencing the Listening to Troubled Families report than it is to see it 
within the Working with Troubled Families report. 
Within this purported exercise of “listening to troubled families” it is also important to reflect upon 
what is omitted from the report as well as what is included. The report features a list of the 
14 
 
characteristics of ‘troubled families’ which emerged from Casey’s interviews, including: 
intergenerational transmission, large families and shifting family make up, dysfunctional 
relationships, anti-social family and friends networks, abuse, institutional care, teenage mothers, 
violence, early signs of poor behaviour, school, anti-social behaviour, mental health problems and 
drug/alcohol abuse (Casey, 2012). From other research with similar families (Bond-Taylor and 
Somerville, 2013; Davies, 2011; Mitchell and Campbell, 2011; Morris, 2012), it could reasonably 
expected that this list would have also included poverty, inadequate housing, disability and physical 
ill health, yet these are conspicuously absent here. It also seems incongruent that worklessness is 
not identified as a concern in spite of the fact that it then forms one of the key criteria for payments 
by results under the new Troubled Families Programme.  
Similarly, the issue of gendered power relations is not identified within either report, in spite of the 
fact that gender fundamentally shapes the nature of ‘family’, the relationships within families, and 
the biographies of harm and abuse experienced by family members. The gender neutral language of 
‘parent’ and ‘parenting’ is used extensively, in spite of the value judgements that are made on a 
gendered basis (eg in the references to teenage mothers) and the fact that these forms of intensive 
family support, and the sanctions attached to them, tend to be levied at families headed by a lone 
female (Parr, 2011). Engaging with a feminist ethic of care would require issues of gender to be 
rendered more visible and for support to families to consider underlying assumptions around the 
gendered distribution of ‘caring’ responsibilities and the subsequent impact upon women’s social 
and economic independence. Projects promoting the ‘empowerment’ of the family often serve only 
to strengthen existing power relations within the family, and between family (and especially 
mothers) and local authority services (Bond-Taylor, 2014b). Interventions within families which fail 
to address such concerns or to prioritise the rights of women to make lifestyle choices have the 
potential to reproduce patriarchal relations and to subject women to additional social control 
(Dominelli, 2002).  
Finally, the model of family intervention described within the Working with Troubled Families 
document appears to be also threatened by the processes put in place to roll out ‘troubled families’ 
interventions across England. The examples of good practice in the report, which appear to reflect 
care ethics and upon which the ‘troubled families’ model is constructed,  are not taken from work 
within the Troubled Families Programme but from other pre-existing family interventions 
programmes developed under New Labour, such as FIPS and family pathfinders. Therefore, even if 
the model of working which is advocated demonstrates some potential for success, questions must 
be raised about whether such good practice could continue within the new framework. The 
Troubled Families programme with its payments by results process developed a much narrower set 
of criteria for inclusion, and with it the potential to direct interventions with families towards those 
specific criteria for which payments could be claimed, ie crime and anti-social behaviour, 
worklessness, and school exclusions and absences (Bond-Taylor, 2014a; Bond-Taylor and Somerville, 
2013). Whilst more recently, additional criteria have been developed for identifying families for 
support, including domestic violence, ‘children who need help’ and ‘parents and children with a 
range of health problems’, tackling these issues does not qualify for payments, and the focus 
remains upon addressing a narrow range of problems experienced by these families with little 
weight given to the role of ‘softer’ outcomes in improving family well-being (Batty, 2013). 
15 
 
Furthermore, the Troubled Families Programme  advocates the development of cheaper ‘light’ and 
‘superlight’ versions of the model where families are smaller or are seen as having fewer problems 
(DCLG, 2012: 31). This will be reflected in the key worker case load with, for example, ‘family 
intervention light’ seeing case loads of 5-15 families per worker (in comparison to 5 or fewer in the 
standard family intervention model). The impact of carrying this considerably larger case load must 
be to reduce the time available to spend with families and thus build constructive relationships with 
them.  This therefore has the potential to water down productive family focused activity and to 
effectively prevent the incorporation an ethic of care into family support. It is important to 
remember that “Such a project cannot be chopped up into short-term, time-limited, discrete 
‘interventions’ delivered by disembodied experts” (Featherstone et al, 2013:1745) and thus the shift 
to family intervention ‘light’ and ‘superlight’ versions should be avoided in order to give the time and 
space to develop meaningful relationships of ‘care’ and support. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Families who have experienced support from a dedicated family intervention service describe the 
support which they have received in terms of care ethics. They judge the value of the interventions 
in terms of the quality of the relationships built between their family members and between the 
family and their key worker. Strengthening relationships provides an important underpinning for the 
improvement of family outcomes across a wide range of issues. Care-full support for families 
provides the opportunity to uncover the complexity of disadvantage and need within a household, 
to understand the family practices which are integral to maintaining the sense of family identity and 
thus to generate resilience in the face of adversity by establishing contextualised solutions. 
Moreover, the positioning of the key worker as advocate between families and other statutory 
services provides a buffer which enables families who have become labelled as ‘troubled’ or 
‘troublesome’ to challenge this depiction and to hold services to account in meeting their needs. 
There is considerable evidence therefore of the value of care ethics within the construction of 
services designed to support disadvantaged families. 
 
Sevenhuijsen’s (2004) Trace method provides a useful framework to trace the normative paradigms 
within Troubled Families policy documents and to evaluate the role of care ethics within the policy. 
Whilst Listening to Troubled Families and Working With Troubled Families are presented as a pair of 
reports in which the former uncovers the problems faced by so called ‘troubled families’ and their 
alleged causes, and the latter offers a solution, they are actually quite different in tone and in their 
portrayal of families. There is also a considerable difference in the extent to which these reports 
demonstrate an ethic of care. Working with Troubled Families offers a model for family intervention 
which clearly draws on care ethics principles of trust and empathy, holistic approaches to identifying 
need and determining how to meet such needs, alongside a collaborative and relational focus to 
delivering interventions. By contrast, Listening To Troubled Families, in spite of its title and the 
implication in Casey’s foreword that she wants to uncover families’ stories, tends to undermine the 
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families’ accounts, presents ‘troubled families’ in a stereotypical format as a homogenous group 
with a fixed set of problems (rather than each as unique), portrays them as evasive and/or passive in 
the face of engagement with services, and blames mothers in particular for their predicament. The 
importance given to the use of sanctions as a means to secure engagement and to promote change 
reflects an ethic of justice which attributes considerable autonomy to family members. 
The body of work which has been generated on ‘care’ as a moral framework is of considerable value 
to any analysis of the Troubled Families Programme, its various predecessors or any future iterations 
which successive governments might bring. The work of ‘doing family’ requires ‘care’, but so does 
the work of supporting families. The challenge is therefore in creating systems of support which 
generate the spaces for key workers to build relationships of trust with families, to develop 
relational understandings of their needs and to explore specific and contextualised solutions and 
strategies of support. Questions about the caseloads allocated to the key workers, the time they can 
spend with families rather than on paperwork, and the pressures that they might be under to 
evidence measurable results for the financial sustainability of the service demonstrate the 
importance of viewing ‘care’ as a political issue and not merely a private, domestic practice. 
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